The newly installed Sky executive apparently angered his father and company chairman Rupert Murdoch by resigning from the board of News Corporation, the holding company for the Murdoch media empire.
Incredibly, in the Sunday Telegraph interview, James claims he learnt of the impending vacancy at Sky only by reading about it in the press.

That same day, the CDC deleted a key sentence from its ricin factsheet: Amateurs can make ricin from castor beans.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has won a major turf battle, confounding efforts to bring intelligence agencies under a single, logical command. His defense budget and fiefdom is preserved, but the nation’s defense is a different issue.
THANKS TO AN old Washington trick — leaking information late on Friday to make sure it appears in the least-read edition of the week — news of Rumsfeld’s victory over CIA Director George Tenet, the man most likely to be ordained “czar” of the sprawling American intelligence community, went largely unnoticed.
The Pentagon’s new intelligence fiefdom would effectively section off (or, in Washington-think, protect the budget of) all the DOD’s agencies from outside interference — a playground that amounts to over 50 percent of all U.S. intelligence assets.

Worse still, the fiefdom has no analytical power or intelligence capabilities of its own. It merely collates the material flowing from the already flawed system.

Back in Soviet times, there was a Russian army general who liked to bellow, "Analysis is for lieutenants and women."
Two pieces of evidence shine all too glaringly: 1) an official, unclassified, and highly critical report on the U.S. Army's inefficient-to-shoddy intelligence practices in Iraq and Afghanistan, written by the Center for Army Lessons Learned in Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.; and 2) the removal of this report from the center's Web site, after the Washington Post published a story summarizing its contents.
Other phrases that pop up repeatedly in the report: "very little to no analytical skills," "lacked the foundations of collective management," "junior officers who had no formal training," "information overflow," "no internal analysis capability," "lack of competent interpreters," "no ability to analyze the information," and so forth.

the report also states that reserve troops specializing in civil affairs and psychological operations sent earlier this year to Afghanistan received "marginally effective" training before their deployment. "The poor quality of mission preparation was inexcusable given that the operation was over a year and a half old," it concludes.