TAJI, Iraq - Misguided U.S. training of Iraqi police contributed to the country's instability and has delayed getting enough qualified Iraqis on the streets to ease the burden on American forces, the head of armed forces training said Wednesday.
http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/20040610/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_fixing_security&cid=540&ncid=716

"It hasn't gone well. We've had almost one year of no progress," said Army Maj. Gen. Paul D. Eaton, who departs Iraq ( next week after spending a year assembling and training the country's 200,000 army, police and civil defense troops.

As U.S. occupation leaders prepare to hand power to an Iraqi government in less than three weeks, Iraq's own security forces won't be ready to take a large role in protecting the country. A U.N. Security Council resolution approved Tuesday acknowledges Iraq's lack of a developed security force and provides a continued multinational troop presence until 2006.

Eaton, a plainspoken officer who didn't shirk responsibility for his role in the problems, said soldiers of Iraq's 2nd Brigade simply ignored U.S. orders to fight their countrymen.

"They basically quit. They told us, 'We're an army for external defense and you want us to go to Fallujah?' That was a personal mistake on my part," Eaton said.

When the uprising broke out in Fallujah, Eaton said he saw a chance to begin transferring the security mission to Iraqi forces. He agreed to allow the Iraqi army's just-created 2nd Brigade to take on guerrillas that had seized control of the restive western city.

"We were premature," said Eaton, 54, of Weatherford, Okla. "I could have stopped it. I had a bad feeling and I should have acted on it."

Wolfowitz also cited the importance of Iraqi commanders and said the April desertions shouldn't have been a surprise because of the Iraqis' shortcomings in training, equipment and leadership.

The lesson learned was that the soldiers needed an Iraqi command hierarchy. Eaton said the soldiers may have battled Fallujah's Sunni Muslim rebels if Iraqi leaders were spurring them on.

Some $257 million in spending authority was held up by Wolfowitz's office for two months, delaying construction of Iraqi army barracks for four brigades awaiting training, the official said on condition of anonymity.

"The soldiers didn't want to fight their own countrymen. Would you?" al-Sattar said as he and Eaton lunched on stewed beef and beans in the base mess hall. "Once there are division commanders and an Iraqi defense minister, the soldiers will start obeying orders because the orders come from an Iraqi leadership."