he said this:
GHWB made it a explicit objective to remove Saddam for the reasons given. GWB carried out the policy. Saddam had called GHWB's bluff and did what he was told not to do. On the chemical side he used Scuds and Frog missiles and most likely the 'missing' artillery shells, he certainly attempted to destroy the oilfields by blowing them up.and this:
It was GHWB's missile crisis when Saddam started lobbing Scuds into Saudi and Israel in '91. Some (9?) had chemical warheads. Saddam never admitted to this and the missiles became permanently 'missing'. Read Scott Ritter's Iraq Confidential, he hardly talks about anything else in terms of real weapons. The entire UNSCOM/UNMOVIC process arose because of the use of these missiles. The sanctions regime (which began as chemical and biological warfare sanctions) also arose because of the use of these missiles. One of the main reasons why Richard Butler had lost co-operation with the Iraqis in '98 was because he was insisting on receiving the arming records of the Scud force (Missile Unit 223). Saddam had known what he had done and some at DoD/CIA knew too but they never brought it into the public domain. Saddam also knew that the US held this over him (Gulf War Syndrome etc) and feared censure under the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Also see Patrick (ex-CIA) Eddington's Gassed in the Gulf. The circumstances surrounding what happened to him (and his wife Robin) are extremely similar to the case of Mr. Wilson.i didnt know lots of that.
see scudwatch.org for more details.
2 comments:
Thanks for the bump. I'm not so sure about the 'smarter' bit, and in any case knowledge is not exclusive, it's a thing to be shared (and compared) with those with an similar interest.
So back to the late Dr. Kelly again.
From the transcript of Andrew Gilligan's statements to Lord Hutton on day 2 of the Inquiry:
LORD HUTTON: I think if you just read the note exactly as it is without putting in any additions or insertions.
MR DINGEMANS: Then I will come back to you and ask you about your questions.
A. The whole thing?
Q. Yes, just reading the note through, if that is all right.
A. "Transformed week before publication to make it sexier. The classic was the 45 minutes. Most things in dossier were double source but that was single source. One source said it took 4 [that should be 45] minutes to set up a missile assembly, that was misinterpreted. "Most people in intelligence weren't happy with it because it didn't reflect the considered view they were putting forward. "Campbell: real information but unreliable, included against our wishes. Not in original draft -- dull, he asked if anything else could go in. "Uranium from Africa -- not nuclear expert but was very suspect, documents certainly forged or forgeries. "10 to 15 years ago there was a lot of information. With the concealment and deception operation there was far less information. "It was small ...", this is the programme, I think. "It was small because you could not conceal a large programme."
LORD HUTTON: Is it "you could not" or "you do not"?
A. "You could not". "... you could not conceal a large programme and because it was actually quite hard to import things. The sanctions were effective. They did limit the programme. No usable weapons. "In one of the Jan", that is a reference to one of the Blix reports by Hans Blix to the UN, it said there were some "chemical reactors which had not been destroyed by UNSCOM. Glass lined chambers to promote chemical reactions. These were being used again by the Iraqis. They were recovered, they were taken to [that should be] Al-Munthanna [another plant] not properly destroyed by the UN, recovered by the Iraqis, taken to Fallujah and used for non-banned purposes." This is him discussing another thing that Blix overlooked. "The 18 chemical missiles", these were missiles with the potential for chemical tipped warheads although I do not think they actually obtained chemicals, "were reported by Blix but they were downplayed. Blix thought they were leftovers." I cannot read it, the type is a bit faint
LORD HUTTON: It looks like "thin". Is it "I think"?
A. "I think it is 30 per cent likely that Iraq had an active chemical warfare programme in the six months to a year and likelier that there was a biological warfare programme."...
So Dr. Kelly was plainly trying to telegraph something to Andrew Gilligan about the Scuds. Hans Blix was downplaying them, why? Even if they were leftovers, they still had to be accounted for.
Surely this is something a 'smarter and more knowledgable' reporter should have picked up on? Instead he focused on and reported on the 45 minutes claim, this (via Dr. Kelly) plainly mentioning 'a missile assembly'. Mr. Blair later claiming that he didn't know what type of weapon system this 45 minute point refered to, and the claim was later downgraded to it being about only 'battlefield weapons'.
Is there more to this than meets-the-eye I wonder?
thnx simon - promoted to the the front page again - apologies for the 24 hour delay
yep - of course - some knowledge shared is some knowledge halved. or something. no, wait. that's something else.
totally appreciate your input.
i'm in the very lucky position where all of my regular commenters are really smart and really knowledgable - welcome to the table.
whats your poison on a sunday morn? we've got coffee, champagne, bloody mary & berocca
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