In a few interviews I've done recently, I've made the statement that I don't think that most Americans are aware of this, from Sibel's Open Letter to Kean & 911Comm:
More than four months prior to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, in April 2001, a long-term FBI informant/asset who had been providing the bureau with information since 1990, provided two FBI agents and a translator with specific information regarding a terrorist attack being planned by Osama bin Laden. This asset/informant was previously a high-level intelligence officer in Iran in charge of intelligence from Afghanistan. Through his contacts in Afghanistan, he received information that: 1) Osama bin Laden was planning a major terrorist attack in the United States targeting four or five major cities; 2) the attack was going to involve airplanes; 3) some of the individuals in charge of carrying out this attack were already in place in the United States; 4) the attack was going to be carried out soon, in a few months. The agents who received this information reported it to their superior, Special Agent in Charge of Counterterrorism Thomas Frields at the FBI Washington Field Office, by filing 302 forms, and the translator translated and documented this information. No action was taken by the special agent in charge, and after 9/11 the agents and the translators were told to "keep quiet" regarding this issue. The translator who was present during the session with the FBI informant, Mr. Behrooz Sarshar, reported this incident to Director Mueller in writing, and later to the Department of Justice Inspector General. The press reported this incident, and a report in the Chicago Tribune on July 21, 2004, stated that FBI officials had confirmed that this information was received in April 2001.I've felt a bit tentative saying: "I don't think that most Americans are aware of this" - because I was never really sure how many people are familiar with this story... As it happens, Scott asked Michael Scheuer, head of the Bin Laden unit, Alec Station, about this, and even he isn't aware of it, in 2007.
Separately, Scheuer says that the 911Commission will be more responsible than anyone for the next terrorist attack in the US.
5 comments:
That was an interesting interview. It seems pretty rare to have a key government official actually be asked informed questions.
Wish he would have asked Scheuer's opinion on 9/11 conspiracies. All these former officials must be somewhat familiar with them.
There was way too much weird stuff going on with al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. They were photographed at the Malaysian terrorist summit in 01/00. Around that time Saudi intelligence told the US they were al Qaeda due to (I believe) some links to terrorist activity in Saudi Arabia in the late 90's. They lived with an FBI informant in San Diego. They reserved and purchased tickets in their own names.
Why didn't the FAA have their names, especially when one considers the FAA received 52 al Qaeda related warnings in the run up to the attacks? Also, the CIA's CTC included at least one FAA official. What did they know about these two men and what did they do about it? Add in the FBI informant and the failure becomes even more difficult to explain.
Then Scheuer says that the idea that the FBI and CIA refused to share intelligence because of turf battles wasn't true as far as he knew.
That would mean that the FBI had months to track al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar instead of about two weeks according to several accounts.
It's rather odd for several accounts of 9/11 by investigative journalists to completely ignore the possibility of deep politics.
thnx
Then Scheuer says that the idea that the FBI and CIA refused to share intelligence because of turf battles wasn't true as far as he knew.
sibel also makes the same statement - and she apparently knows it to be fact.
From the Joint Inquiry. Sen. Wyden speaking to Claudio Manno (Associate undersecretary for intelligence at TSA):
WYDEN: With respect to Al Mihdhar and Al Hazmi, did your agency have the names of those two hijackers prior to September 11, 2001?
MANNO: Know, sir, we did not.
WYDEN: If you had, what steps would have been taken had you had that information?
MANNO: Well, prior to 9/11, we had a process -- and we had a so- called watchlist, which was disseminated to the industry of the other security directive process. In fact, a number of the people that were -- we suspected were involved in the -- what we call the Manila plot -- the Bojinka (ph) plot, as you refer to it -- were on that list.
And, again, what we would -- the purpose of that process was to highlight, for the air carriers, particular individuals -- individuals that had ties to terrorist groups and that presented a threat to aviation who should either be denied boarding or should be, if they showed up for boarding, be called to the attention of law enforcement.
Had we had information that those two individuals presented a threat to aviation or were -- posed a great danger, we would have put them on that list and, you know, they should have been picked up in the reservation process. (1)
Sorry folks but this points to a conspiracy. I guess we know why the Helgerson IG internal review report is still classified.
We are expected to act like the good citizens of 1984 and pretend that 2+2=5.
Doesn't work. The 9/11 account doesn't add up. Nothing could be less patriotic than pretending that 2+2=5.
Nothing could be less patriotic than pretending that 2+2=5.
unless your president asked you to.
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